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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Heurtebise v. Reliable Business Computers, Inc.*
At first glance, Heurtebise v. Reliable Business Computers, Inc. I is a
run-of-the-mill contracts case. In this case, the Michigan Supreme Court's
only holding is that an employee handbook did not create a binding contract
where the employer "did not intend to be bound by any of the provisions
contained in the handbook." 2 Yet, there is much more to this case than its
non-controversial holding. The real issue in Heurtebise was whether a
prospective arbitration agreement can be enforced to resolve an employment
discrimination claim arising under Michigan's civil rights laws.
3 Although
no decision was rendered with respect to this issue, strong dicta by Justice
Michael F. Cavanagh indicates that such agreements might be unenforceable
in Michigan. 4
In Heurtebise, the plaintiff, Theresa Heurtebise, brought suit under the
Michigan Civil Rights Act 5 and sought money damages, alleging that the
defendant, Reliable Business Computers, Inc., fired her because of her
gender. 6 During her employment, the plaintiff violated company policy by
taking lunch breaks that exceeded one hour. The plaintiff was ultimately
terminated for violating this policy, while a male coworker who also took
long lunch breaks did not receive similar discipline.
7
The company moved to dismiss the plaintiff's suit or, in the alternative,
to compel arbitration.8 In support of this motion, the company introduced
evidence that the plaintiff agreed to be bound by the terms and policies
contained in the employee handbook and that this handbook provided that
all claims involving money damages would be submitted to binding
arbitration. The trial court denied both motions holding that enforcement of
the arbitration agreement in this case violated Michigan public policy.
9
A Michigan appellate court reversed, holding that the handbook created
a binding contract and that enforcing an agreement to arbitrate an
550 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1996).
1 See id.
2 rd. at 247.
3 See MICH. CoMp. LAws § 37.2101 etseq. (1985).
4 See Heurebise, 550 N.W.2d at 247-258. Justice Cavanagh felt obligated to resolve
this issue because it was addressed by the court of appeals. See id. at 247.
5 See MICH. COMp. LAWS § 37.2101 et seq. (1985).
6 See Heurtebise, 550 N.W.2d at 245.
7 See id.
8 See id. The motion to dismiss was brought pursuant to M.C.R. 2.116(C)(4); the
motion to compel arbitration was brought pursuant to M.C.R. 3.602. See Id.
9 See id. at 246.
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employment discrimination claim did not violate Michigan public policy.
10
As support for its decision, the appellate court cited the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., t as
standing for the proposition that no public policy existed against enforcing
arbitration agreements involving civil rights claims.12 As further support,
the court of appeals noted that, because arbitration is a desirable alternative
to litigation, "arbitration clauses are to be liberally construed with any
doubts to be resolved in favor of arbitration." 13 The court of appeals
concluded that enforcement of this arbitration agreement only selected the
forum in which the plaintiff could have her claim resolved and that this did
not diminish her rights under the Michigan Civil Rights Act.
14
The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The court held that the
employee handbook did not create a binding contract because the company
did not intend to be bound by the handbook and, consequently, did not
intend to be bound by the arbitration agreement.' 5 Therefore, there was no
need to decide whether the arbitration agreement was enforceable to resolve
the employment discrimination claim. Nonetheless, Justice Cavanagh felt
compelled to address this issue, concluding that the arbitration agreement
was unenforceable.16
In arriving at this conclusion, Justice Cavanagh answered three
questions. First, can an employee be compelled to arbitrate her federal
discrimination claim where the arbitration agreement is contained in an
individual employment contract? Second, is Michigan more committed to
protecting an employee's right to pursue discrimination claims in a judicial
forum than its federal counterpart? And finally, is Michigan pubic policy
violated by enforcing prospective arbitration agreements involving statutory
civil rights claims?'
7
10 See Heurtebise v. Reliable Business Computers, Inc., 523 N.W.2d 904 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1994).
11 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
12 See Heurtebise, 523 N.W.2d at 906.
13 Id. (citing Chippewa Valley Schools v. Hill, 233 N.W.2d 208 (Mich. Ct. App.
1975).
14 See id.
15 See Heurrebise, 550 N.W.2d at 247. The court's decision is based on evidence that
was not part of the record before the court of appeals. This evidence consisted of the entire
employee handbook. The court of appeals only had a portion of the handbook before it. The
omitted portion of the handbook critical to the Michigan Supreme Court's decision was a
portion that stated that the company could modify any of the policies contained in the
handbook "at its sole discretion." Id.
16 See id. at 258.
17 See id. at 248.
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Justice Cavanagh examined whether a federal court would compel an
employee to arbitrate her federal discrimination claim where the arbitration
agreement is contained in an individual employment contract. He argued
that the federal courts were not in agreement. His analysis began with the
Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer.
18
In Gilmer, an employee sued his former employer under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 19 claiming that he was
discharged because of his age. The employer moved to compel arbitration
because the employee, as a condition of employment, signed a securities
registration form that contained a mandatory, binding arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court held that the employee was required to submit his
discrimination claim to binding arbitration and could not bring suit in a
judicial forum.20 In arriving at this conclusion, the Court held that the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 21 applied and that it established a strong
federal policy in favor of arbitration.22 In short, the Gilmer decision stands
for the following proposition: statutory employment discrimination claims
will be subject to mandatory, binding arbitration agreements unless it is
shown that Congress specifically disapproved of allowing the particular
18 Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer, a general assumption existed that
employment discrimination claims were not subject to mandatory, binding arbitration
agreements. This assumption was based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Alexander, the employee claimed that he had
been discharged because of his race. He brought suit in federal district court under Title VH
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (Title VII) 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994), but he also filed a
grievance with his union. The grievance was submitted to binding arbitration, and the
arbitrator ruled that the discharge was justified. The Supreme Court held that the employee
was entitled to seek judicial relief for his Title VU claim, notwithstanding the fact that the
arbitrator found his discharge to be justified. Among other things, the Court was concerned
that arbitrators might lack the requisite experience to decide claims brought under Title VII
and that typical arbitration procedures are either inadequate or unavailable. See id. at 52-58.
After Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. was decided, some commentators argued that an
arbitration agreement did not prohibit an employee from litigating his employment
discrimination claim in a judicial forum. See Stephen P. McGowan & Robert J. Schiavoni,
7he Steelworkers' Trilogy and the Coal Miners' Trilogy: Is Discrimination an Exception to
the Rule?, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 737, 761 (1989); Nicholas W. Loebenthal, The Arbitrability of
ADEA Claims: Toward an Epistemology of Congressional Silence, 23 CoLUM. J.L. & Soc.
NoBs. 67, 86 (1989).
19 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (1994).
20 See Gilmer, 500 U.S at 35.
21 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (1994).
22 500 U.S at 25.
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claim at issue to be waived in favor of arbitration.
23
Nonetheless, because the arbitration agreement at issue in Gilmer was
not contained in an individual employment contract, there is some doubt
whether the Supreme Court would extend Gilmer to cases where the
arbitration agreement was contained in an individual employment contract. 24
Indeed, the Gilmer Court expressly refused to decide whether a similar
result would follow when the arbitration agreement is contained in an
employment contract. 25 Therefore, according to Justice Cavanagh, Gilmer
did not decide the issue presented in this case.
26
Justice Cavanagh then proceeded to examine the decisions of the lower
federal courts that had addressed this issue. Although noting that several
courts had enforced arbitration agreements to resolve employment
discrimination claims, he noted two cases that suggested a contrary view
where the arbitration agreement was contained in an employment contract:
Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.27 and Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc.28 Both Willis and Alford distinguished the securities registration form at
issue in Gilmer from an employment contract. 29 This distinction is crucial
because the FAA, the act which favored arbitration of the age
discrimination claim at issue in Gilmer, specifically exempts "contracts of
employment of. .. any . . . class of workers engaged in . . . interstate
commerce." 30 Therefore, Justice Cavanagh concluded that there is no clear
answer from the federal courts with respect to whether arbitration
agreements contained in employment contracts are enforceable.
31
Justice Cavanagh's examination of the federal case law is unconvincing.
It is likely that the majority of federal courts would enforce the arbitration
agreement at issue in Heurtebise. Several courts, including the courts that
2 3 See id. at 26.
24 See Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or
Coercive Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY 1. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 131, 131 (1996)
("The enforceability of mandatory arbitration policies contained in employment contracts
between employees and their direct employers remains an open question, even after the
Supreme Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate Johnson Lane Corp.").
25 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. The trend among the lower federal courts, however, appears to
be that the Gilmer decision also applies to those cases in which the arbitration agreement is
embodied in individual employment contracts. See infra note 29.
26 See Heurtebise, 550 N.W.2d at 248.
27 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991) (dicta).
28 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting that courts should be mindful of the possible
distinction between an employment contract and a securities registration form).
29 948 F.2d at 312; 939 F.2d at 230.
30 9 U.S.C. § 1(1994).
31 See Heurtebise, 550 N.W.2d at 249.
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decided Willis and Alford, have given a very narrow reading to the
employment exemption, concluding that it covers only the contracts of those
employees who are "actually engaged in the movement of goods in
interstate commerce."
32
The plaintiff in Heurtebise performed computer software support
work.33 She was not actually involved in the movement of goods in
interstate commerce. Her employment contract would not fall within the
FAA's narrow exemption for "contracts of employment of. . .any...
class of workers engaged in... interstate commerce." 34 Therefore, if this
case were being decided by a federal court, the mere fact that the arbitration
agreement was embodied in an employment contract as opposed to a
securities registration form would not preclude the federal court from
applying the Gilmer decision and enforcing the arbitration agreement.
Nonetheless, even if the federal courts would enforce the arbitration
agreement at issue (which they most likely would), Justice Cavanagh would
not follow federal precedent in this case.3 5 Justice Cavanagh argued that
"Michigan . . .has an unwavering history of faithfully defending an
aggrieved individual's right to a judicial forum to remedy unlawful
32 Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 1995). See also
Matthews v. Rollins Hudig Hall Co., 72 F.3d 50 (7th Cir. 1995); Rojas v. TK
Communications Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1996); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Albert v. National Cash Register Co., 874 F. Supp.
1324, 1327 (S.D. Fla. 1994). But see Long v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined
Shows, Inc., 9 F.3d 340, 342 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Prior arbitration of claimant's grievance does
not foreclose trial de novo in the district court." (citing Alexander, 415 U.S. at 38));
Mittendorf v. Stone Lumber, 874 F. Supp. 292, 294-295 (D. Or. 1994) (holding that FAA
exemption applies to all employment contracts).
33 See Heurtebise, 550 N.W.2d at 245.
34 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
35 Like most states, Michigan will look to federal cases interpreting Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 when interpreting its own civil rights law. See Radtke v. Everett, 501
N.W.2d 155 (Mich. 1993). Justice Cavanagh noted, however, that Michigan courts do not
follow federal precedent "when the Michigan statute provides greater protection to victims of
discriminatory actions than Title VII provides." Heurtebtse, 550 N.W.2d at 250 (citing Eide
v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 427 N.W.2d 488 (Mich. 1988).
However, given the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Allied-Bruce
Terminex Cos. v. Dobson, 115 S. Ct. 834 (1995), Justice Cavanagh's power to disregard the
FAA in a case like the present is in serious doubt. In Allied-Bruce Tenninex, the Court held
that the FAA applies to all contracts within the scope of Congress' broad commerce power.
Id. at 841. For a discussion of the Allied-Bruce Terminex case, see Jay A. Yurkiw, Recent
Development, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. REsOL. 223 (1996).
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discrimination. "3 6 In his opinion, the Michigan Civil Rights Act differs in
important respects from federal discrimination law, and these differences
would preclude Michigan courts from following federal precedent and
enforcing the arbitration agreement.
For example, while federal discrimination law requires an aggrieved
individual to exhaust administrative remedies with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission before bringing suit, the Michigan Constitution
specifically rejects the requirement that a plaintiff exhaust administrative
remedies with respect to employment discrimination claims brought under
Michigan law.37 In short, Justice Cavanagh would not follow federal case
law because "the Michigan constitutional and statutory enforcement scheme
for civil rights is significantly different from the statutory enforcement
scheme for federal discrimination statutes with respect to an aggrieved
individual's access to judicial remedies."3 8 Michigan's civil rights law is
simply more concerned about assuring victims of discrimination access to
court than its federal counterparts.
Finally, Justice Cavanagh argued that the enforcement of a prospective
arbitration agreement to resolve a state civil rights claim violated Michigan
public policy.3 9 Although Justice Cavanagh did not believe that federal case
law resolved the public policy issue, he did believe that the Gilmer decision
provided some guidance. He agreed with the Gilmer Court's decision to
answer the question presented in that case by looking to legislative intent.
40
Therefore, he looked to the legislative intent behind the Michigan Civil
Rights Act to determine whether the arbitration agreement at issue violated
Michigan public policy.4 1 He also looked to the intent behind the new
Michigan Constitution adopted in 1963 as civil rights were prominently
discussed during its adoption. 42 However, before making either inquiry he
reviewed the Michigan Supreme Court's treatment of civil rights prior to
the adoption of the new Michigan Constitution.
43
More than a half century before Michigan adopted its current
Constitution, the Michigan Supreme Court decided Ferguson v. Gies.44 In
Ferguson, the court held that a victim of unlawful discrimination was
36 Heurtebise, 550 N.W.2d at 248.
37 See id. at 250 (citing MICH. CONST. art V., § 29). This rejection is also codified in
Michigan statutory law. See id. (citing Mica. COMP. LAws § 37.2803 (1985)).
38 Id. at 250.
39 See id. at 258




44 46 N.W. 718 (Mich. 1890).
[Vol. 12.2 1997]
HEURTEBISE v. RELIABLE BUSINESS COMPUTERS, INC.
entitled to bring a civil action.45 Justice Cavanagh viewed the Ferguson
decision as standing for the proposition that "whenever a particular equal
protection right is recognized, whether by constitution, statute, or common
law, then fused to that right is the right to pursue judicial relief."46 This
view, he argued, is further supported by the Michigan Supreme Court's
decision in Pompey v. General Motors Corp.47 In Pompey, the court held
that an employee could bring a civil action under the Fair Employment
Practices Act,48 even though the .right to bring a civil action was not
expressly authorized by the act. This is significant bicause, in the usual
case, the remedy provided for the violation of a statutory right is exclusive.
Justice Cavanagh argued that Ferguson and Pompey underscore the
importance Michigan places upon protecting an individual's right to seek
relief from unlawful discriminatory acts in ajudicial forum.
In 1963, the people of Michigan adopted a new Constitution that
contains a section providing for the creation of the Michigan Civil Rights
Commission. 49 This section also provides: "Nothing contained in this
section shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct and
immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state." 50 Justice
Cavanagh found this section ciucial to the resolution of the public policy
issue because it protects an aggrieved party's Tight to proceed directly to
court, and, in essence, rejects the requirement that an aggrieved party
exhaust her administrative remedies before bringing suit.5 1 In other words,
this clause "reveal[s] that the role of the judiciary in enforcing civil rights
was to remain supreme."
52
Justice Cavanagh also pointed to the debates surrounding the eventual
inclusion of this language as further evidence of the paramount importance
placed upon an aggrieved individual's right to seek redress for
discrimination in a judicial forum. In particular, he pointed to the debate
surrounding the Donnelly Amendment, the predecessor of the above-quoted
language. 53 Explaining the importance of rejecting the exhaustion of
45 See id. Interestingly, the Michigan Supreme Court in Ferguson rejected the "separate
but equal" doctrine ultimately adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See id.
46 Heurneblse, 550 N.W.2d at 251.
47 189 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 1971).
48 MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 423.301.-423.311 (replaced by MICH. COMP. LAWs §§
37.2102 et seq. (1985) in 1977).
49 See MICH. CONST. art V., § 29.
50 rd.
51 See Heuriebise, 550 N.W.2d at 254.
52 id.
53 See Id. The Donnelly Amendment provided: "These provisions shall not be construed
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administrative remedies requirement, one supporter stated: "I submit that
the only place that any rights have ever been protected have been in the
courts of this land, and when you start saying the courts of the land may not
act, then I am wondering what direction you really want to go, and do you
really believe in the democracy and freedom of people....54
In addition to the new Michigan Constitution and the debates
concerning the Donnelly Amendment, Justice Cavanagh found relevant the
fact that the Michigan Civil Rights Act specifically allows aggrieved
individuals to proceed directly to court.55 Together, these facts "reveal that
an aggrieved individual's access to judicial remedies is inseparably
interwoven with the substantive civil rights and was intended by the people
of Michigan to be the lifeblood of keeping those substantive civil rights
alive." 56 Justice Cavanagh concluded with the following statement:
I believe that the right to be free from unlawful discrimination is of
highest priority and too important to jeopardize. I further believe that
the constitutionally guaranteed direct access to a judicial forum is so
interwoven with the enforcement of civil rights in Michigan that we
cannot separate them without potentially harming substantive civil
rights. Accordingly, I would hold that the Michigan Constitution and
our longstanding public policy preclude the enforcement of
prospective arbitration agreements in employment contracts [to
resolve civil rights claims].
57
It is uncertain whether Michigan courts will adopt Justice Cavanagh's
conclusion, as it was dicta. Regardless, it is unlikely that federal courts will
be influenced by his argument because the trend among the federal courts is
to apply Gilmer to cases in which the arbitration agreement is contained in
an employment contract (except for those contracts that fall within the
FAA's narrow exemption), and enforce the arbitration agreement. 58
The larger question is what effect, if any, will Justice Cavanagh's
conclusion have on cases arising under the discrimination laws of other
states. His arguments are based on facts specific to the history and
development of Michigan civil rights law. Therefore, it is doubtful that
to deny, or enable or allow the denial of, any direct and immediate legal or equitable remedy
in the courts of this state, to any person affected thereby." Id. (citing 2 Official Record,
Constitutional Convention 1961, p. 1999).
54 Id. at 255.
55 See Heurtebise, 550 N.W.2d at 256.
56 Id. at 257.
57 Id. at 258.
58See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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employees in other states could avail themselves of his reasoning in this
respect because the development and history of their state's civil rights law
probably varies significantly from that of Michigan's civil rights law.
Yet, a significant portion of his argument is based upon Michigan's
rejection of the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. Like
Michigan, several other states do not require exhaustion of administrative
remedies before bringing an employment discrimination claim. 59 Therefore,
employees who reside in these states are in a better position to take
advantage of Justice Cavanagh's conclusion.
60
Regardless of the outcome of cases such as Heurtebise, there is no
escaping the fact that employment discrimination claims are increasingly
being resolved through various forms of alternative dispute resolution
including binding arbitration. 61 Nonetheless, several commentators have
warned of the inherent dangers in compelling employees to arbitrate their
employment discrimination claims.62 For example, arbitral procedures
usually provide for minimal discovery. Yet, because employment
59 See Ward v. City of Pawtucket Police Dep't, 639 A.2d 1379 (R.I. 1994); Green v.
City of St. Louis, 870 S.W.2d 794 (Mo. 1994); Jones v. Glenville State College, 433 S.E.2d
49 (W.Va. 1993); Elek v. Huntington Nat'! Bank, 573 N.E.2d 1056 (Ohio 1991); Harrison v.
Boston Financial Data Servs., Inc. 638 N.E.2d 41 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994).
60 But cf. Polk County Secondary Roads, Polk County Bd. of Supervisors AFSCME
1868, and AFSCME Int'l v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 468 N.W.2d 811, 816-817 (Iowa
1991) (holding that a statutory employment discrimination claim is not arbitrable because Iowa
law requires an aggrieved individual to first file with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission).
61 For example, employment discrimination claims have been successfully resolved
using both mediation and arbitration. See Linda S. Crawford, The Americans with Disabilities
Act: ADR: A Problem-Solving Approach for Business, 50 APR.-JUN. DISP. RESOL. J. 55, 58
(1995) (In Maine, over a two-month period 30% of the discrimination cases that were referred
for mediation were successf.ully mediated.); R. Gaull Silberman et al., Alternative Dispute
Resolution of Employment Discrimination Claims, 54 LA. L. Ray. 1533, 1557 (1994) (In its
pilot mediation program, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has reported that
over half of the completed mediations have produced an agreement.); Ann C. Hodges,
Dispute Resolution Under the Americans With Disabilities Act: A Report to the Administrative
Conference of the United States, 9 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 1007, 1095 n.449 (1996); Robert J.
Lewton, Comment: Are Mandatory, Binding Arbitration Requirements A Viable Solution for
Employer Seeking to Avoid Litigating Statutory Employment Discrimination Claims?, 59 ALB.
L. REV. 991, 993 n.3 (1996).
62 See Ronald Turner, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims
With Special Reference to the Three A's-Access, Adjudication, and Acceptability, 31 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 231, 234-235 (1996) (noting that compulsory arbitration of employment
discrimination claims "tests the scope and limits of mandated private adjudication imposed
upon employees who wish to have their cases heard by the federal courts.").
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discrimination is often a subtle practice, to "the extent that discovery is
curtailed, the plaintiff's substantive rights may also be limited." 63 Also,
arbitration deprives state and federal courts of the important opportunity to
consider and interpret the different employment discrimination statutes. 64
As a result, the development of the law of employment discrimination may
be impeded.
Although Justice Cavanagh's conclusion in Heurtebise does not have
the force of law and will most likely not inhibit the further expansion and
application of Gilmer, it acts as a strong reminder to other courts that there
is something unique about discrimination claims, something that
differentiates discrimination claims from claims that have traditionally been
thought well-suited for binding arbitration. 65 Discrimination, whether based
on race, sex, religion, age, national origin or handicap, is the product of
ignorance, fear and often hatred and contempt. Its victims suffer a personal
injury which goes to the very core of their being. There is definitely a hint
of unfairness in compelling an employee to settle his discrimination claim in
the manner decreed by the very person who has already shown an inability
to play fair. For these reasons, courts should respect the opinion expressed
by Justice Cavanagh, and refrain from hastily assuming that employment
discrimination claims are subject to mandatory, binding arbitration just like
any other commercial dispute.66
Matthew D. Miko
63 Note, Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 104 HARv. L. REV. 568, 584 (1990).
64 See id.
65 See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974) ("[A]rbitral
procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a
comparatively inappropriate forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title Vl.').
66 For example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs bringing
suit under Title VII can be compelled to arbitrate their discrimination claim only if they
knowingly agreed to submit their discrimination claim to arbitration. See Prudential Ins. Co.
of America v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304 (9th Cir. 1994). Also, the American Arbitration
Association has devised special rules for the arbitration of employment discrimination claims.
See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASS'N, EMPLOYMENT DisPum RESOLUTION RULES (1993).
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